Restitution [2015] by YIP, Man
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University




Singapore Management University, manyip@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons
This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
YIP, Man. Restitution [2015]. (2016). Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review of Singapore Cases. 593-603. Research Collection
School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2395




LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxford); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law,  
Singapore Management University. 
Introduction 
23.1 In 2015, there were only three cases that substantively discussed 
the law of unjust enrichment and restitution. This is not because 
restitutionary claims have grown unpopular; in fact, they had been 
advanced in a number of other cases. However, on these other 
occasions, the court (rightly) dismissed the claims without delving into 
the law, owing to the low prospects of success of the restitutionary 
claims in some cases and the success of the principal claims which 
rendered the alternative restitutionary claims unnecessary in others. 
23.2 Only three cases notwithstanding, important restitutionary 
issues have been raised, including difficult topics such as risk-taking 
reasoning and subjective devaluation. In an area of the law that is 
steeped in contention and divides the common law world, the Singapore 
courts have made commendable efforts to clarify the complexity that 
has confounded practitioners by correcting misconceptions and 
highlighting the relevant doctrines that underpin the parties’ arguments. 
Unjust enrichment 
Old forms of action 
23.3 The Court of Appeal had on two recent occasions, viz, Alwie 
Handoyo v Tjong Very Sumito [2013] 4 SLR 308 (“Alwie Handoyo”) and 
Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801 
(“Anna Wee”), explained the modern approach to the law of unjust 
enrichment. Two related matters are of paramount importance for 
purposes of bringing unjust enrichment claims. First, the Court of 
Appeal had in Alwie Handoyo highlighted that “common” counts of 
action such as an action for “money had and received” were historical 
forms of action that had been abolished; they do not disclose the 
underlying cause of action: Alwie Handoyo at [124]–[125]. Where the 
action is based in the law of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff is to plead 
unjust enrichment and establish the requisite elements by following the 
four-question framework of analysis: 
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(a) Has the defendant been enriched? 
(b) Was the enrichment at the plaintiff ’s expense? 
(c) Was the enrichment unjust? 
(d) Are there any applicable defences? 
In (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 465–467, paras 22.2–22.5, 
commenting upon the Court of Appeal’s clarification, it was pointed out 
that there are claims based on unjust enrichment which have been 
historically pleaded under other counts in indebitatus assumpsit: for 
example, quantum meruit (value for services received by the defendant). 
Litigators continue to use this historical label instead of pleading the 
relevant cause of action. There are two problems with the continued 
reference to old forms of action. First, it has long been established under 
Singapore law that there are two types of quantum meruit: contractual or 
restitutionary: see, for example, Rabiah Bee Bte Mohamed Ibrahim v 
Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR(R) 655 at [123], per Judith Prakash J. 
Where there is a contract, a quantum meruit claim for remuneration 
essentially means that the plaintiff is asking the court to imply a term 
into the agreement for reasonable remuneration to be paid. The focus is 
on the objectively ascertained intentions of the contracting parties: 
Benedetti v Sawiris [2014] AC 938 at [9]. A restitutionary 
quantum meruit, in contrast, is focused on the defendant’s gains. 
23.4 The second problem with the persistent use of historical labels 
is the risk that parties do not plead their unjust enrichment claims in 
accordance with the proper framework of analysis. Instead, they 
consider a cause of action having been made out by simply proving that 
services had been performed for the benefit of the recipient. This, in 
particular, obscures the unjust factor inquiry. This ties in the second 
matter to note in relation to advancing unjust enrichment claims. It was 
stressed by the Court of Appeal in Anna Wee: under Singapore law, 
claims in unjust enrichment must be based on a relevant “unjust factor” 
such as mistake, failure of consideration, etc: Anna Wee at [129]–[134]. 
The label quantum meruit, however, singularly focuses on the fact that 
services have been received by the defendant, but that fact alone does 
not justify payment. Nor does the fact that services have been 
performed for the defendant establish that there is an enrichment – the 
element of enrichment must be examined by reference to the recognised 
enrichment tests: see Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of 
Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2015) ch 4. As a result, 
parties bring ill-conceived unjust enrichment claims which neither 
advance their own interests nor facilitate the development of the law of 
unjust enrichment in Singapore. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
(2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev Restitution 595 
 
23.5 This was what happened in Cheong Soh Chin v Eng Chiet Shoong 
[2015] SGHC 173 (“Cheong Soh Chin”). In that case, the plaintiffs 
entrusted substantial funds to the defendants for various investments 
which were held through a web of special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) 
controlled by the defendants. The investments were undertaken 
pursuant to the “WWW concept”, a long-term investment plan that the 
parties had the common intention to work towards. The concept would 
combine the first defendant’s industry knowledge and personal 
connections with the plaintiffs’ capital and risk appetite. The plan was to 
find, fund and assist fledgling fund managers in the market to start a 
new fund each, and the parties would earn a proportion of each fund 
manager’s total profits. Owing to the parties’ “close personal relationship 
of trust and confidence”, the court noted (at [16]) that they did not enter 
into any contract (oral, written or implied) to govern their relationship. 
Nevertheless, it was not disputed that the plaintiffs agreed to pay the 
first defendant a management fee of US$450,000 per annum in respect 
of the first five investments that were entered into to get the WWW 
concept off the ground but which were not part of the WWW concept. 
It was also not disputed that this agreement did not extend to the 
subsequent investments undertaken as part of the WWW concept. 
23.6 The WWW concept proved unachievable, and the parties’ 
relationship, both on the personal and professional levels, deteriorated 
and became ultimately unsalvageable. The plaintiffs commenced 
proceedings to ask for the transfer of the ownership and control of the 
investments and the SPVs, as well as for a full account to be taken on the 
defendants’ management of the investments. The defendants 
counterclaimed against the plaintiffs for management fees and 
reimbursement of expenses incurred in respect of their management of 
the plaintiffs’ investments. Of interest is the defendants’ counterclaims 
for work done and expenses incurred in managing the plaintiffs’ various 
investments which were said to be based on restitutionary 
quantum meruit because the court found that there was no agreement 
for payment on the facts. 
23.7 From the judgment, it was clear that the defendants did not 
identify the relevant unjust factor. For unjust enrichment claims based 
on supply of services, the unjust factor would typically be failure of 
consideration, free acceptance or mistake, although it should be borne 
in mind that free acceptance has not yet been conclusively recognised as 
an unjust factor under Singapore law: see (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 473 
at 480–481, paras 23.21–23.24. It should also be noted that these unjust 
factors have different requirements and therefore justify restitution for 
different reasons. Mistake and failure of consideration are concerned 
with a plaintiff ’s imperfect intention to confer the relevant enrichment. 
On the other hand, free acceptance, if accepted as an unjust factor, is 
focused on a defendant’s unconscientiousness in accepting the 
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enrichment in circumstances knowing that it was not conferred by the 
plaintiff gratuitously and there was reasonable opportunity for return of 
the enrichment received: see (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev 473 at 481, 
para 23.24. 
23.8 Following from the defendants’ failure to plead the relevant 
unjust factor, the court was unable to undertake the conventional 
analysis of determining if the pleaded unjust factor had been made out 
on the facts of the case. Instead, it resorted to risk-taking reasoning to 
explain its decision to deny restitution in the case. Based on the 
evidence, it concluded (at [51]) that the parties were “joint risk-runners 
working together towards the WWW concept”. The court commented 
(at [87] and [101]) that the defendants performed their services with the 
anticipation of being compensated out of the profits from the WWW 
concept if it should succeed; thus, they took the risk that future 
compensation might not materialise. The risk-taking was supported by 
the fact that the defendants never attempted to ask for remuneration for 
work done that fell outside of the scope of the parties’ agreement: at [89] 
and [98]. Indeed, the court stressed (at [88] and [100]) that the fact that 
there was a specific agreement for payment of certain services militated 
against the success of restitutionary quantum meruit claims in respect of 
other services rendered. Simply put, the court was suggesting that such 
claims would upset the parties’ contractual allocation of risks: the 
plaintiffs’ payment responsibility would be limited to what was provided 
for in the agreement. Finally, the court took note that the defendants did 
not furnish independent expert evidence of the relevant market practice 
that would justify their entitlement or quantification of management 
fees: at [90]. 
23.9 As for expenses incurred, the court applied essentially the same 
reasoning, highlighting that there was no agreement for reimbursement 
of the expenses claimed by the defendants. Instead, the parties had from 
time to time entered into specific agreements for specific expenses to be 
reimbursed and this fact foreclosed the possibility of non-contractual 
claims. 
Risk-taking reasoning 
23.10 Owing to the defendants’ ill-considered pleading, “risk-taking” 
reasoning was employed by the court in Cheong Soh Chin (above, 
para 23.5) as a direct bar against recovery. The precise role of risk in 
unjust enrichment reasoning is not immediately apparent from the 
modern framework of analysis (see para 23.3 above). The relevance and 
necessity to have recourse to risk-taking reasoning for the law of unjust 
enrichment has been a source of controversy, even though the language 
is clearly established in cases (notably, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
(2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev Restitution 597 
 
Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] 1 AC 558 and Yeoman’s Row 
Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008] 1 WLR 1752). Wilmot-Smith forcefully 
argues that risk-taking reasoning is “circular, ambiguous, inconclusive, 
incapable of explaining decided cases and unnecessary”: see Frederick 
Wilmot-Smith, “Replacing Risk-taking Reasoning” (2011) 127 LQR 610. 
That a plaintiff is a risk-taker is no more than stating the conclusion. In 
his view, the courts should provide more transparent reasoning by 
closely analysing the relevant unjust factor. Others have defended 
risk-taking reasoning, suggesting its appropriateness as a bar against 
restitution: Paul S Davies, “Risk in Unjust Enrichment” (2012) 
20 RLR 57 and James Goodwin, “Contract, Unjust Enrichment, and 
Risk” (2012) 128 LQR 503. 
23.11 However, on any view, the unjust factor must be discussed and 
cannot be replaced by risk-taking reasoning. Not only is the unjust 
factor a constituent element of the cause of action, but it also directs 
attention to the proper questions to ask in each case and helps us better 
understand the interplay between risk and unjust enrichment. For 
example, had the defendants in Cheong Soh Chin pleaded failure of 
consideration as the relevant unjust factor, the parties’ submissions as 
well as the court’s focus would be on the basis underlying the 
defendants’ performance of services. Even in the commercial context, 
one is not automatically a risk-taker simply for having performed 
unrequested services. If the type of service is one that recipients are 
commonly expected to pay for and the benefit has been received 
without protest, it is less likely that the service provider is a risk-taker. 
The availability of independent expert evidence on market practice is 
thus significant. The court must also inquire into the parties’ shared 
understanding in relation to the performance of the services (that is, the 
basis) and it is in this light that the existence of specific agreements 
relating to other services, as well as attempts to seek payment, become 
relevant. 
23.12 Only with more precise analysis of the circumstances by 
reference to the potentially applicable unjust factor will one be able to 
fully appreciate the various reasons put forward by the court in 
Cheong Soh Chin as to why the unjust enrichment claims were 
dismissed. 
Subjective devaluation 
23.13 In Cheong Soh Chin, the court also briefly discussed the 
principle of subjective devaluation. The plaintiffs, in defence against the 
defendants’ counterclaim for management services in relation to a hotel 
fund, asserted that the services performed were worthless or were worth 
less than their market value to them: Cheong Soh Chin at [102]. The 
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court correctly pointed out that this is the defence of subjective 
devaluation which was introduced by the late Peter Birks. Whilst a 
recipient of money cannot argue that he was not enriched, a recipient of 
benefits in kind may argue that he does not value the benefit or he does 
not value the benefit to the extent of its market value: see Peter Birks, An 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, 1985) at p 109. 
The court noted that this defence is now part of English law, citing 
Sempra Metals Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2008] 1 AC 561: 
Cheong Soh Chin at [104]. 
23.14 The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs’ argument of 
subjective devaluation on the basis that it appeared to be “a self-serving 
afterthought”: Cheong Soh Chin at [105]. It said that whilst the hotel 
fund project was “an abysmal commercial failure”, its failure was largely 
due to the plaintiffs’ decisions and choices: Cheong Soh Chin at [105]. It 
is not immediately apparent what the court meant by this. After all, 
subjective devaluation is not an argument based on hindsight, that is to 
say, it is to be made in the present case by reference to the success of the 
project to which the services had been directed or the causes of the 
project’s failure. What the court probably meant was that it was not 
convinced that the plaintiffs genuinely did not value the defendants’ 
services or valued them less than the market rate. 
23.15 The leading authority on subjective devaluation is the UK 
Supreme Court’s decision in Benedetti v Sawiris (above, para 23.3). The 
case concerned a claim in unjust enrichment for restitution of services 
performed. Although the Supreme Court used the language of 
“quantum meruit” to refer to the claim, it clearly analysed (at [10] 
and [11]) the matter based on the four-question framework of analysis 
(above, para 23.2). The only issue on appeal concerned the value of 
unjust enrichment in the case and it was in this context that the 
principle of subjective devaluation was canvassed. 
23.16 If the benefit in question is services, Benedetti v Sawiris 
confirmed (at [14]) that the court is to evaluate the value of the services 
themselves and not any end-product or subsequent profit earned by the 
defendant. Lord Clarke, delivering the majority judgment, stated 
(at [15]) that the starting point of valuation of enrichment is objective 
market value, and the market value refers to “the price which a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have had to pay for 
the services”: at [17]. The objective market value is, however, open to 
downward adjustment by subjective devaluation. Lord Clarke further 
explained (at [19]) that subjective devaluation embodies the 
“fundamental need to protect the defendant’s autonomy”. He said 
(at [17]) that: 
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… although a court must ignore a defendant’s ‘generous or 
parsimonious personality’, it can take into account ‘conditions 
increasing or decreasing the objective value of the benefit to any 
reasonable person in the same (unusual) position’ as the defendant. 
Disagreeing with Lord Reed, Lord Clarke said (at [26]) that the 
defendant’s genuine subjective opinion of the value of the claimant’s 
services could be taken into account to reduce the value of the 
enrichment in circumstances where the defendant had not freely 
accepted the benefit. In other words, Lord Clarke’s conceptualisation of 
subjective devaluation is applicable to both establishing the existence of 
the enrichment as well as the valuation of the enrichment. 
23.17 Lord Reed, who agreed that subjective devaluation is concerned 
with the protection of the defendant’s autonomy, was of the contrary 
view that subjective devaluation does not apply to the valuation of 
enrichment: at [122]–[135]. This means that if the defendant has chosen 
the benefit, the valuation is strictly based on market value; it is not 
dependent upon the recipient’s idiosyncratic and subjective valuation of 
the benefit. As such, on Lord Reed’s understanding of subjective 
devaluation, it only applies to establish the existence of the enrichment. 
Lord Reed’s justification for such an approach is two-fold: (a) “value”, in 
its economic sense, is assessed by reference to the market instead of 
personal valuation; and (b) the objective of unjust enrichment is to 
restore the plaintiff to the financial position of the services which he has 
performed. Given that the appeal before the UK Supreme Court did not 
raise issues of freedom of choice, it was unnecessary to determine which 
approach was appropriate. Lord Neuberger thought that the two 
approaches will yield the same outcome in a great majority of the cases; 
any difference would be one of procedural analysis: at [189]. 
23.18 The decision in Benedetti v Sawiris therefore raised many 
difficult issues for consideration and should indeed be referred to on the 
next occasion an argument of subjective devaluation is made before the 
Singapore courts. In particular, the argument of subjective devaluation 
should be raised and assessed within the four-question structural 
framework of analysis for any claim in unjust enrichment. This is 
because the argument can be defeated in some circumstances: for 
example, where the benefit in question is an incontrovertible benefit or 
where the defendant has freely accepted the benefit. Moreover, making 
an argument of subjective devaluation within the context of determining 
whether the defendant has been enriched enables more nuanced issues 
to be examined: for instance, whether valuation of enrichment is 
dependent upon the defendant’s subjective opinion; and whether the 
particular issue of protection of the defendant’s autonomy should be 
addressed within the “enrichment” inquiry, the “unjust factor” inquiry 
or defences. Accordingly, in order for the law of unjust enrichment to 
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develop in a principled and coherent manner in Singapore, courts 
should not allow parties to bypass the “enrichment” inquiry or indeed 
any of the other questions in the framework of analysis by mere 
reference to quantum meruit. 
Restitution for wrongs 
Restitution for wrongs versus restitution for unjust enrichment 
23.19 Notwithstanding the Court of Appeal’s clarification in Alwie 
Handoyo (above, para 23.3) that restitution for unjust enrichment is to 
be distinguished from restitution for wrongs (see (2013) 14 SAL 
Ann Rev 465 at 466, para 22.4), litigators continue to be confused by the 
terminology. In ARS v ART [2015] SGHC 78, the court noted that the 
plaintiff ’s submissions on its unjust enrichment claim was “puzzling” 
because whilst the submissions referred to the requirements for an 
unjust enrichment claim, they went on to consider cases for restitution 
for wrongs and concluded by stating that their case was an appropriate 
one for the award of Wrotham Park damages on the basis of the first 
defendant’s tortious wrongdoing: ARS v ART at [276]. 
23.20 In an effort to resolve the confusion, the court proceeded at 
length to cite from leading commentaries to demonstrate the distinction 
between restitution for unjust enrichment and restitution for wrongs: 
ARS v ART at [278]–[279]. Restitution for wrongs raises a remedial 
issue: whether gain-based remedies should be available for civil 
wrongdoing. The cause of action is made out based on the relevant 
species of wrongdoing: for example, breach of contract or torts. 
Restitution for unjust enrichment, on the other hand, is concerned with 
reversing transfer of benefits from the plaintiff to the defendant. Unjust 
enrichment is a separate cause of action which requires the plaintiff to 
show that the defendant has received an enrichment at the expense of 
the plaintiff and there is a relevant unjust factor to justify restitution. 
Going forward, it is hoped that lawyers will pay serious heed to the 
judicial guidance on the subject. 
23.21 The ill-considered pleadings and submissions notwithstanding, 
the court had no difficulty in dismissing the plaintiff ’s restitutionary 
claim without even having to decipher the nature and kind of claim that 
was brought: ARS v ART at [281]. Restitution for wrongs was hopeless 
on the facts of the case given that the plaintiff failed to establish the 
underlying tortious wrongdoing. Restitution for unjust enrichment was 
unsuccessful because there was no unjust factor to support the cause of 
action. As the court highlighted, “tortious conduct” on the part of the 
first defendant is not a recognised unjust factor (see the list of unjust 
factors set out by the Court of Appeal in Anna Wee (above, para 23.3) 
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at [132]–[133]): ARS v ART at [281]. In some cases, the defendant’s 
wrongdoing which caused the transfer of the benefit from the plaintiff 
to the defendant may be said to be based on the highly controversial 
unjust factor “ignorance” (also known as “lack of consent”) or “want of 
authority”. However, neither “ignorance” nor “want of authority” has 
been accepted as a recognised unjust factor under Singapore law: see 
(2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 471–472, paras 22.19 and 22.20. 
Moreover, in this case, the underlying “tortious conduct” had not been 
established. 
Wrotham Park damages 
23.22 It is interesting to note that the plaintiff ’s submissions in ARS v 
ART assumed that Wrotham Park damages are restitutionary in nature. 
Given that its claim was wholly unsuccessful, this issue did not warrant 
the court’s discussion. However, the issue is one that deserves some 
attention should a dispute with the right facts come before the Singapore 
courts. The label “Wrotham Park damages” was derived from the case 
Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 
(“Wrotham Park”), where the English High Court awarded substantial 
damages in lieu of an injunction for breach of a restrictive covenant 
attaching to land. In Brightman J’s words, the award was (Wrotham Park 
at 815): 
… [a] sum of money as might reasonably have been demanded by the 
plaintiffs from [the defendant] as a quid pro quo for releasing the 
covenant. 
23.23 For some time, there had been debate in English law whether 
Wrotham Park damages should be treated as restitutionary or 
compensatory in nature: see Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 at 
282–284. On one view, the damages are restitutionary because it was 
awarded, by reference to the defendant’s gain, for the wrongdoing. On 
another view, the damages are compensatory, being awarded to 
compensate for a lost opportunity to bargain for the relaxation of the 
restrictive covenant/release from relevant obligations. It appears that the 
English authorities are presently in favour of the compensatory account 
of Wrotham Park damages: see World Wide Fund for Nature v World 
Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc [2008] 1 WLR 445 at [59]. 
Indeed, the compensatory principles were recently discussed by the 
English High Court in CF Partners (UK) LLP v Barclays Bank plc [2014] 
EWHC 3049 (“CF Partners (UK) LLP”). Hildyard J explained that the 
Wrotham Park damages approach determines the quantum of 
compensation based on a hypothetical bargain negotiation between the 
parties: CF Partners (UK) LLP at [1196] and [1197]. However, Hildyard J 
acknowledged that the hypothetical bargain approach is “artificial” and 
necessarily involves “a question of impression”: CF Partners (UK) LLP 
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at [1199]. In CF Partners (UK) LLP, there was “an enormous disparity in 
the parties’ respective views as to what would have been their 
negotiating positions” which makes the exercise even more difficult: 
CF Partners (UK) LLP v Barclays Bank plc at [1200]. In Wrotham Park, 
the court expressly found that the claimants would never have agreed to 
the relaxation of the restrictive covenant, thereby rendering the 
hypothetical bargain approach clearly fictitious. 
23.24 As such, whether the dominant view in English law regarding 
the true nature of Wrotham Park damages ought to be adopted in 
Singapore law is a matter for debate. 
The user principle 
23.25 In Paul Patrick Baragwanath v Republic of Singapore Yacht Club 
[2016] 1 SLR 1295 (“Paul Patrick Baragwanath”), the High Court was 
faced with an appeal on the quantification of damages arising from a 
vessel’s trespass into a marina. In considering the issue of quantification 
of damages, the court touched upon the much-debated “user principle”. 
The user principle allows for awards of damages based on the reasonable 
hire of the property that has been unlawfully detained or used by the 
defendant. Whilst the principle is well established, it remains 
contentious as to whether the principle is restitutionary or 
compensatory in nature. The nuances of the debate was canvassed in 
great detail in (2013) 14 SAL Ann Rev 465 at 477–480,  
paras 22.33–22.40. The local authority on the user principle is the Court 
of Appeal decision in ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily 
[2013] 4 SLR 1317 (“Yenty Lily”). In that case, the Court of Appeal 
declined to conclusively decide on the jurisprudential debate concerning 
the true nature of the user principle, but it expressed tentative 
preference, in obiter, for a restitutionary account. Notably, in Yenty Lily, 
the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s award for loss of rental by 
reference to the conventional compensatory measure. In (2013) 14 SAL 
Ann Rev 465 at 479, para 22.39, it was suggested that by acknowledging 
a compensatory principle that is independent of the user principle, the 
Court of Appeal had practically resolved in obiter that the user principle 
is restitutionary in nature. 
23.26 Returning now to Paul Patrick Baragwanath, the court noted 
that the debate concerning the nature of the user principle remains a live 
one under Singapore law: Paul Patrick Baragwanath at [19]–[22]. 
However, it declined to comment further on the matter because the 
conventional compensatory principle was applicable to the dispute. This 
is notwithstanding the court’s acknowledgment that an argument might 
be made in the case that the marina owner suffered no loss because the 
berths were “largely unoccupied” and there might be no hirers even if 
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there had not been a trespass by the vessel: Paul Patrick Baragwanath 
at [24]. The court cited Romer LJ’s observation in Strand Electric and 
Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 AB 246 
(“Strand Electric”) for the proposition that compensation would be 
awarded even if the owner might not have found a hirer of its property. 
The court could have directly relied on Yenty Lily for the same 
proposition instead of referring to the English case of Strand Electric, 
especially given the diverse routes of reasoning in Strand Electric. For 
instance, Denning LJ proceeded upon a restitutionary analysis for the 
award made in Strand Electric. In Yenty Lily, the plaintiff failed to prove 
that the property could have been hired out during the period of 
detention by the defendant. Yet, the Court of Appeal found that the 
plaintiff was entitled to compensation under the conventional 
compensatory principle because she suffered the loss of being deprived 
of the use of her property for the purpose of her business: Yenty Lily 
at [60]. The court in Paul Patrick Baragwanath could have adopted the 
same reasoning in the view that the case similarly involved property that 
was being applied for commercial hire. 
23.27 One may then ask: When might recourse to the user principle 
be necessary, given the applicability of the compensatory principle to a 
great majority of cases? According to the Court of Appeal in Yenty Lily, 
the user principle – on a restitutionary analysis – might be employed to 
yield a substantial award for the plaintiff in cases where there is a proven 
benefit but no proven loss: Yenty Lily at [48]. Penarth Dock Engineering 
Co Ltd v Pounds [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 359 was such a case. The plaintiffs, 
the lessees of a dock which was going to shut down, sued the defendant 
for trespass by reason of his refusal to remove his floating pontoon that 
was stored at the dock, notwithstanding numerous requests for its 
removal. Lord Denning MR found that the plaintiffs suffered no 
financial loss because they were intending to shut down the dock and 
would not have earned from the hire of its berths. 
23.28 It seems, therefore, the occasion for a conclusive determination 
of the nature of the user principle under Singapore law must wait for a 
dispute which calls for its application to come before the Singapore 
courts. 
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